Petri Lahtinen
Rawls’ theory summarized
When discussing the various theories of justice in the 20th century, the influence of the American philosopher John Rawls cannot be overlooked. Rawls’ theory was not only a major departure and a novel alternative to the utilitarianism that had long dominated Anglo-American thought regarding the questions of justice, but it also generated a significant number of advocates, developers and critics. Rawls’ work Theory of Justice, published in 1971, represents the so-called social contract tradition, in which the principles of social order are outlined through an imaginary initial situation: here the contracting parties unanimously decide to agree on the rules of a polity. The social contract tradition can be traced to the writings of thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651), John Locke (Two Treaties of Government, 1689) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Du contrat social, 1762) in the 1600s and 1700s. Whereas these older contract theories often took the social order itself or the duties of citizens towards their rulers as their starting point, Rawls’ approach was to outline the principles of justice through the act of contracting. In contrast to historical theories, Rawls rejected the ideal of an external, neutral authority, and instead in his own theory he emphasised the social contract entered into by free and equal people. However, impartiality has significant presence in Rawls’ theory. Probably the best-known concept in this theory is the veil of ignorance. This refers to the hypothetical contractual situation preceding a social contract, in which the parties are behind this imaginary veil of ignorance when coming up with the contract. Here they are unaware of their own individual characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, family background, inherent abilities and so forth. Rawls went on to introduce what he called natural lottery, whereby a person is assigned at birth different characteristics, which Rawls divided into three categories: 1) genetic or biological characteristics; 2) social conditions; and 3) misfortunes, or factors that impair the individual’s ability to flourish. The initial situation should not be understood as an actual, concrete possibility, but above all as a tool of thinking to assess the fairness of social institutions and structures.
For Rawls, the principle of justice should be pursued in a society based on the fair cooperation and freedom as well as equality between citizens. Rawls considered these principles to be twofold: first, every human being should have an equal right to the broadest possible overall system of equal fundamental freedoms, which can be combined with a similar system of freedom for everyone. Second, social and economic inequalities must be organised according to two conditions: they must be linked to posts and positions which are open to all on the basis of fair equality of opportunity, and they must confer the greatest possible benefit on the least advantaged. Thus, from an economic point of view, Rawls’ theory is based on an equal distribution of income and on the opposition to the growth of relative income disparities. These principles of justice, in turn, should first be implemented in accordance with the so-called basic institutions of societies. By basic institutions, Rawls meant the arrangements that apply to all citizens and govern the functioning of society in general, such as taxation, health care, social security, and education.
These principles of justice, according to Rawls, would be chosen in an imaginary initial situation in which rational and equal contracting parties entered a social contract behind a veil of ignorance. The principles chosen determine how the basic institutions of society distribute the basic goods that all people, despite their distinctive characteristics, need to lead a decent life. Rawls himself saw these goods as falling into five categories: 1) basic freedoms and rights; 2) the freedom of movement and choice of occupation; 3) certain basic prerogatives; 4) a basic level of income and welfare; 5) the social basis of self-respect. Here Rawls criticised the fictional utilitarian starting point, which relates justice to a calculatory total utility rather than a concern for the distribution of welfare within society. For the principles of justice, Rawls considered the method of selecting them to be central. In particular, Rawls considered fairness to play an important role in this respect, since, if applied, the principles chosen would also be fair and thus acceptable to rational parties of the agreement. Such a theory is referred to as methodological justice. Rawls interpreted his own theory as representing pure methodological justice, where one knows the method that will achieve a just outcome, but does not know in advance what exactly that outcome would be. In a hypothesis like the veil of ignorance, the contracting parties acting on the basis of rationality can be assumed to act impartially while pursuing the public interest, which, in turn, also makes the process fair.
Rawls’ initial decision making is also characterised by the so-called maximin principle, where in a choice situation, the option with the worst outcome is the best of all the options under comparison. The idea may seem counterintuitive, but in Rawls’ theory of justice, the parties to the agreement behind the veil of ignorance are above all concerned with the worst possible outcome that might fall on them, and thus interested in ensuring that it is as good as possible. It should be noted, however, that Rawls was prepared, at least in theory, to allow certain inequalities in income distribution as long as it was in some way beneficial to the most disadvantaged. This is also known as the difference principle, according to which social and economic inequalities can be tolerated as long as they benefit the most disadvantaged people. Rawls’s theory also incorporates the concept of concatenation, which assumes that an increase in the income of the poorest will lead to an increase in the income of other groups. A final concept worth highlighting from the early days of Rawls’s theory is the reflective equilibrium. This means that a fair initial situation that constitutes a set of principles of justice should not first be considered in advance and then be satisfied with whatever principles that initial situation might lead to. Indeed, the process of defining principles is a continuous weighing up of both the initial situation itself and the relationship between the evaluations considered on the basis of that initial situation. Reflective equilibrium is a method of justifying ethical judgements and aims to achieve a situation in which the theoretically formulated principles of justice, the corresponding practices, and the rational convictions of the parties to the agreement are brought into a state of equilibrium.
In Rawls’ theory, any rational individual should accept the principles selected in the initial situation as long as the individual in question first accepts the initial situation itself. Once the principles have been selected, their implementation through the previously described basic institutions leads, according to Rawls, to a stable social order. This, in turn, guarantees the preservation of the basic institutions and justice regardless of other social changes. At the same time, however, Rawls recognised that democratic societies are diverse and contradictory in their values and worldviews. Rawls’ theory, as we have seen, often emphasises the concept of rationality. He chose it as the basis for political justice rather than the concept of truth because, as he argued, it allowed morally rational views to coexist in a way that the concept of truth could not. It should be noted, however, that Rawls also draws a distinction between practical rationality and moral rationality, following Immanuel Kant here. On the basis of moral rationality, Rawls developed the idea of what has been called the argument for the morally rational man. This idea, according to Rawls, guarantees the objectivity of political convictions. Even if people are morally rational, they may still have significant disagreements on moral issues. Rawls himself referred to this phenomenon by the term burden of judgement. In defending one’s own rationally formed moral judgments and conceptions of the good, there is no way to prove that they are inconsistent or untenable.
Despite internal contradictions, Rawls believed that society could function as long as the basic structure of society was guided by the concept of political justice, which in turn was based on over-lapping consensus. This refers to the consensus that rational members of society can reach in the pursuit of social order despite their truly divergent values and worldviews. However, in order to achieve an overlapping consensus and a functioning society, representatives of different theories of truth and norms must accept the principles of freedom and equality of citizens as their ideals. More generally, Rawls argued that tolerance can only really exist between people whose conception of the good is based on moral rationality. Here Rawls again emphasises the concept of rationality, which has already been mentioned several times, and which must be understood as rationality on the one hand and fairness on the other: individuals with different values and world views must consider the demands of others in their demands. Reciprocity is important here: members of society should engage in fair and equitable cooperation that benefits all, rather than individuals pursuing only their own interests. Equally, public reason is an important concept here. In line with the principles of political justice, it requires the use of common reasons in social debate.
Rawls’ theories on international relations and global politics
In his 1999 work The Law of Peoples, Rawls returned to the theory of political philosophy he had developed in his Theory of Justice and extended it to include particularly international relations and global politics. Rawls begins by outlining the decentralised and anarchist nature of the international system. He attempts to adapt the original principle of the initial situation to the international situation, whereby the principles of international law would be decided behind a veil of ignorance by representatives of different communities. As with individuals, Rawls also recognises the existence of differences between different communities: he distinguishes between so-called decent and liberal nations: the political system of liberal nations can be characterised as political liberalism, while decent nations have different political systems, although they all still respect the principles of justice. Just as the members of a single society can reach an overlapping consensus, both decent and liberal societies can live in harmony within an international system.
The central concept in Rawls’s theory of global politics is the law of peoples, which gives the work its title. By this Rawls meant the principles that guide the actions of states in the international arena. These principles include the obligations of non-intervention, assistance, and the promotion of human rights. Thus, states should not interfere in the internal politics of other countries without their consent, but they do have a duty to assist each other in emergencies and to promote universal human rights. According to Rawls, the policy of non-intervention is based on the idea that states should respect the political and moral sovereignty of other states. Mutual assistance, on the other hand, should be understood as a duty of solidarity to help those communities which, for one reason or another, are unable to maintain a just political system on their own. This can include measures such as humanitarian aid and development aid. Such assistance can also be understood in some cases as an exception to the principle of non-intervention where the recipient country is unable to organise its own society fairly. In particular, extreme human rights violations would, according to Rawls, justify such intervention. More generally, Rawls considered human rights to be a fundamental principle of international law: the international community should respect the basic human rights of all individuals, and international law should be based on the protection of these rights. However, it was precisely the issues of tolerance that Rawls was significantly more cautious about than in the realm of internal social organisation. Rawls acknowledged the limitations of the supposed universality of liberalism when he argued that it was unreasonable to require all governments to commit themselves to liberalism, and also noted the ability of non-liberal societies to maintain order and justice.
In the pursuit of global justice, Rawls stressed above all the importance of the various international institutions and organisations responsible for cooperation between states and for global political issues in general. It should be stressed that Rawls did not support the idea of world citizenship in his theory, as this would have required the existence of a state in which all the people of the world enjoy ‘justice in fairness’, personal freedom (human rights) and at least a ‘minimum income’. Rawls does not bother to discuss the concept of world government that this would require, or any of the problems associated with it, because he rejects the idea altogether. Indeed, the existence of a world state would imply the above-mentioned requirement of a commitment to political liberalism, which would be incompatible with the principles of diversity and tolerance.
Criticism
Although John Rawls’ theory of justice has been undeniably influential in 20th century thinking on the issues of justice, his theory has not escaped criticism. Rawls’ theory has been criticised in many and numerous ways, and it is not even possible to review all of these criticisms here, even in the short term. Instead, it must suffice here to present generally some of the most significant criticisms of Rawls’ theory.
Rawls’ initial version of his theory of justice has been criticised for excluding physically and mentally disabled individuals and animals. For example, the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum has criticised Rawls’ social contract theory for assuming that the parties to a contract are more or less identical in rationality, abilities, and needs. Nussbaum observes that parties to a contract may also take into account people with disabilities in the planning of the contract, but one might equally ask why they should not be parties to the contract; it is, after all, one thing to experience disability rather than to imagine it. Equally, Nussbaum thinks that non-human animals should also be included in global justice. Again, Nussbaum argues that one should ask who agrees on the principles of society and for whom the principles of society are formulated. Similarly, it should be assessed whether these questions mean that non-human animals should be excluded from the principles of the social contract. It is evident that our choices affect the lives of non-human animals; they are active agents in their own right and human actions often make their lives more difficult in one way or another.
In general, Rawls’ initial theory and its veil of ignorance can rightly be criticised for being essentially theoretical and hypothetical constructs. They have often been accused of being overly idealistic, and it has been argued, for example, that the elimination of more blatant injustices is more important than the refinement of an ideal model of a just society. In any case, the applicability of Rawls’ theory to real, lived reality is questionable. In particular, thinkers of the communitarian school of thought have criticised Rawls’s theory from this point of view. Communitarianism stresses that the morality of a community is inherently bound up with the culture and customs of that community: thus, morality cannot be defined in terms of abstract and universal principles that are independent of time and place. Although Rawls respected the diversity and contradictions of worldviews and values, he failed to recognise the fact that moral judgements are not universal and timeless. Instead, a truly just social contract requires constructive debate and argumentation. This includes the capability to neutrality that accepts multiculturalism and an appreciation of different views of justice in international affairs.
The idea of the natural lottery and the chain of thought that follows from it, according to which the special qualities of individuals should be exploited for the benefit of society, has been criticised. Such reasoning, critics argue, easily leads to a view in which the qualities of individuals are collectively owned by society. Thus, society can exploit these qualities and the benefits produced by them as it sees fit. This would require a strong state, to say the least, and at worst such thinking can lead to totalitarian rule, where the sovereignty of individuals is compromised and reduced to a resource for the government to exploit. In particular, this criticism was raised by one of Rawls’ early critics, the American libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick. He also criticised the difference principle on the grounds that it required transfers to equalize income.
Here we can also raise a key criticism, not only of Rawls’ theory of justice, but also of the historical theories of justice in general that Global Visions has examined so far. The feminist critique points out that modern social philosophy tends to focus exclusively on a male-dominated and Eurocentric perspective: first, such thinking is often characterised by a dichotomy between public, or male-dominated politics, and private, or female-dominated domesticity. Theories of justice are mainly concerned with the public sphere, while issues that remain in the private sphere have historically been marginalised for a long time. Today, it should be self-evident that work done in the home, for example, is valuable to society, and that many different forms of injustice can occur within the home. Many feminist theories therefore propose an ethic of care alongside the justice discourse, emphasising caring for others based on a universal sense of empathy and duty. It should be noted, however, that feminist theories do not form a single school of thought, but that within them there is a diversity of emphases and views. Second, the general debate on the theories of justice tends to focus mainly on theories originating from Western culture. These theories often take for granted that key concepts such as morality and rationality are based on values and worldviews in the imagined Western monoculture. In today’s highly globalised world, the pursuit of global justice and its principles should also be able to take into account perceptions, moral judgements, and norms outside Western culture in relation to issues of justice. Without this, it is impossible to imagine true global justice.
It should be stressed that Rawls’ theory deals with justice in relation especially with economy, as Rawls viewed there to be a fundamental connection between the two: Rawls saw economic efficiency as a worthwhile goal, but according to the difference principle it must benefit everyone. From this point of view, the justice envisioned by Rawls has not materialised: since the 1980s at the latest, income and wealth inequalities have increased on a global scale, and the position of the already rich and wealthy in particular has become even more entrenched. Economists such as Branco Milanovic and Thomas Piketty have demonstrated that phenomena such as globalisation and investor-intensity, and the economic growth they have fostered, have benefited not only the middle classes in developing countries but also particularly the upper classes in wealthy countries. Furthermore from the point of view of ecology and strong sustainability, basing justice on economic growth is questionable, especially in the light of the current environmental crises. If respect for planetary boundaries and ensuring living conditions that allow for a dignified life are considered to fall within the scope of morality and ethics, it is appropriate to consider that consumption decisions, for example, have ethical dimensions. Questions of justice can therefore no longer be confined to the economic sphere, but must be considered holistically from the point of view of the conditions of life.
Conclusion
As has been noted many times, the influence of John Rawls and his theories is undeniable and important for modern social philosophy and theories of justice. Rawls’ The Theory of Justice was a major departure from the utilitarianism of the past, turning the focus from utility to justice and returning the social discourse to the contract theoretic tradition. Similarly, Rawls was later to address international politics and questions of justice in his Law of the People. Despite the importance of Rawls’ thinking, his theories have been criticised from the outset. It is therefore clear that, despite his good and noble intentions, Rawls was unable to provide a satisfactory and definitive solution to the so-called problem of justice: it is a perennial problem that requires constant development and critical reassessment. In the following text, we will therefore examine certain theories of justice which are critical responses and alternatives to Rawls’s theory.
SOURCES:
Barry, Brian: Theories of Justice. London: Harvester – Wheatsheaf, 1989.
Garzón Valdés, Ernesto: Onko moraalisesta järkevyydestä moitteettoman moraalin mittapuuksi. niin & näin 4/98, pp. 65-73.
Herne, Kaisa: Mitä on oikeudenmukaisuus. Gaudeamus, Helsinki 2012.
Herne, Kaisa: Oikeudenmukaisuusteoriat kohtaavat talouden. niin & näin 1/16, s. 122-123.
Miklaszewska, Justyna: “Rawls on Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice.” In Uncovering Facts and Values. Vol. 107. United States: BRILL, 2016. 323-335.
Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.
Nussbaum, Martha: Frontiers of Justice. MA: The Belknap Press, 2006.
Rawls, John: A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Rawls, John: The Law of Peoples. With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Sandel, Michael: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
