Max Tallberg
The development of the world can be described by examining the evolution of equality, justice, freedom, and systems of governance. The ultimate goal of humanity’s social progress can be seen as a state in which these four elements are realized in ways that genuinely serve the well-being of all humankind. In recent years, there have been notable changes for the better in these respects: at the very least, awareness of these issues has increased, partly due to the influence of the internet and social media. Phenomena such as the Arab Spring, Fridays for Future, as well as the Me Too and Black Lives Matter movements are examples of this. Yet it is equally clear that much work remains to be done: even if the realization of justice, equality, freedom, and good governance is characterized as the ultimate social aim of humankind, it is realistic to assume that the struggle for their achievement will never fully come to an end. Humanity’s progress ultimately returns to how individual human beings fare—both physically and mentally. A flourishing global society can only be achieved by ensuring that its members are provided with the conditions for a good and dignified life. Many of the values, policy tools, and visions related to this are already known today, but they have not been implemented extensively enough. In the following blog texts, I will focus on the ways and visions already at our disposal that can be used to ensure the global realization of human rights. At the same time, I will examine how these methods and visions can be more firmly rooted and strengthened in today’s world.
In this first text, I will look into the historical development of human rights. First, this provides an understanding of how human rights have taken their present form; second, it allows us to sketch their possible future. In the second text, I will discuss how human rights are understood today. In the third and fourth texts on this theme, I will approach human rights from a variety of perspectives. In this initial essay, I will place side by side both the intellectual and the societal developments that have shaped the history of human rights. It is evident that these two levels have influenced one another, even though the interaction has not always been straightforward or easy to disentangle.
Historical evidence for the defense of human freedom and dignity dates back to the 18th century BCE, when such themes appeared in the so-called Code of Hammurabi in Babylonia. Similarly, in ancient Greece the Stoics spoke of natural rights: these were defined as rights that did not depend on laws, beliefs, or customs rooted in any particular culture or government. Such natural rights were defined as universal and inalienable; they could not be nullified or restricted by human laws or actions. The theory of natural rights has reappeared throughout history and was typically contrasted with rights defined by law. Historical evidence therefore suggests that across human history there has persisted an idea of timeless ideals connected to human rights. Societies, albeit slowly, have developed in the direction indicated by these ideals. The Magna Carta of 1215 is often seen as the earliest example of codified human rights and of a constitutional document. It was an agreement between the King of England and the nobility that limited the king’s power and highlighted individual rights by prohibiting the imprisonment of any free man without a fair trial. Although the Magna Carta cannot be considered an exemplary human rights declaration from today’s perspective, it nevertheless laid an important foundation for later developments.
Reflections on rights related to natural law continued to evolve during the Middle Ages. In the late 13th century, the theory of the separation of soul and body emerged, influencing the development of individuality. Medieval Christian philosophy also maintained that God had instilled in human beings a natural inclination to do good and act accordingly. Thomas Aquinas in particular addressed this line of thought and emphasized humanity’s special position compared to other living creatures. From these ideas, natural rights could again be derived. Over time, however, such theological reasoning lost its dominance. By the 17th and 18th centuries, thinkers increasingly adopted the view that human rights were accessible solely through human reason and did not require faith in God. By the end of the Enlightenment in the late 18th century, the secular concept of human rights had replaced the concept of natural law, although natural rights were still seen as a background influence. The 1689 English Bill of Rights can be viewed as a concrete historical advancement of human rights at the state level and has even been said to have served as a model for modern human rights declarations. The Bill of Rights prohibited excessive bail, excessive fines, as well as cruel and unusual punishments. Enlightenment thinking found concrete expression in societies through the American struggle for independence and the French Revolution, both of which championed ideals of human rights and equality.
Human rights, however, are not merely articles written into legal documents: they also concern how we think about and treat other people—including ourselves. The feelings associated with them must also be such that they can be shared and communicated with others. A universal human experience of justice and injustice is one of the central requirements for demanding the realization of human rights worldwide. Similarly, universal conceptions of freedom and individual autonomy—the ability of individuals to make moral, independent decisions and judgments—are also part of this experience. The development of thought about human autonomy can thus be seen as a central factor in the evolution of human rights thinking. This includes recognizing every human being as a legal individual who, by virtue of their separateness, is entitled to the protection and inviolability of their humanity. Among these rights are access to food and health. It must also be understood that human rights pertain not only to the bodily but also to the mental dimension of existence. All these elements, and their realization, must once again be acknowledged both in oneself and in others. The concepts of autonomy and empathy, which were necessary for the acceptance of modern human rights, took on new forms in the 18th century, even though they had deep historical roots. Over the centuries preceding the 1700s, as we have seen, the human individual gradually differentiated from the dominance of community and developed into an increasingly independent actor, both legally and psychologically.
The development of human rights can also be examined by considering the growth of individuals in their social and cultural contexts, rather than focusing solely on grand historical and political trajectories. In this regard, it has been suggested that social changes linked to human rights arose above all through the fact that individuals shared similar experiences of them and engaged with one another in relation to these experiences. Empathy is built into human psychology, but new developments in intellectual history helped people better understand that their private experiences could be shared with others. For human rights to become universally recognized, it was first necessary for ordinary people to accept them. In this context, historian Lynn Hunt has highlighted the importance of popular novels that preceded the rise of human rights, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie and Samuel Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa. The dramatic rise of the novel in the 18th century has been linked not only to the emergence of capitalism and the middle class, but also to changing conceptions of the nuclear family and gender roles, and even to the birth of nationalism. The Enlightenment’s ideal of autonomy fits into this development as well. Immanuel Kant argued that enlightenment is intellectual autonomy—the ability to think for oneself. Political scientist Benedict Anderson has likewise pointed out that newspapers and novels fostered the development of the kind of community nationalism requires to thrive. The attitude and experience tied to all these phenomena can be described with the term “imagined empathy.” Instead of seeing imagined empathy merely as the foundation of nationalism, it is even more accurate to regard it as the foundation of human rights. It involves the ability to imagine another person as capable of being like oneself.
The most decisive document in the later development of human rights is indisputably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. It reaffirmed the individual rights that had emerged in the 18th century, including equality before the law, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to participate in political decision-making, protection of private property, and the prohibition of torture and cruel punishments. At the same time, it outlawed slavery and advocated universal suffrage. It also proclaimed the rights to free movement, nationality, and marriage. The Declaration’s ambition is evident in its mention of more controversial rights such as social security, the right to work and to fair remuneration, the right to rest and leisure, and the right to education, which should be free at the primary level. The UN Declaration stands apart from earlier thought by highlighting broader rights related to well-being. The classical first-generation rights of the 17th and 18th centuries were primarily negative: they aimed chiefly at preventing abuses, with the possible exception of rights to life and property. The rights added in the UN Declaration, by contrast, are positive: they emphasize the individual’s freedom to determine how to live their life. In this way, the number of rights has grown, as has the scope of individuals included under them. These positive rights can also be approached through broader reflections on the good life, rather than being tied directly to the obligations of implementing other human rights.
When the Declaration was proclaimed in the late 1940s, the Cold War had just begun, and the document was seen more as an aspirational ideal than as an immediately achievable reality. It articulated moral obligations that the international community ought to assume, but did not present concrete means to achieve them. Today, by contrast, it can be argued that these goals are closer to realization; at the very least, we now have a genuine possibility of reaching them. However, as our current times have shown, this is perhaps one of the greatest challenges humanity is currently facing.
The UN Declaration has, in any case, set the standard for international discussion on human rights for over 70 years, crystallizing a struggle for rights that had lasted for 150 years before its adoption. It has been argued that when the theological basis of human rights thought was abandoned, no fully new foundation replaced it. This has meant that human rights today lack a universally accepted justification; natural rights had been grounded in natural law, but the airtight justification of modern human rights has proved more elusive. Yet as human rights now function as a universal norm and are widely accepted, it can reasonably be assumed that people experience them at least in part in similar ways. In the next blog text, I will turn to how human rights are defined today and what this entails.
References
Clapham, Andrew (2015). Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Hampshire: Oxford University Press.
Griffin, James (2008). On Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hunt, Lynn (2007). Inventing Human Rights: A History. New York: W.W. Norton.
Joseph, Peter (2017). The New Human Rights Movement. Dallas: BenBella Books.
Pogge, Thomas (2008). World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
