Petri Lahtinen
In the previous blog post, I explored what kind of role did the concept of eudaimonia i.e., happiness as it is commonly translated, play in the ancient Greek philosopher Plato’s theory of justice. Further, I tried to outline how Plato’s philosophy could still be applicable in this respect in the present-day as we pursue a better and more just world. The concept of eudaimonia had a significant role also in Aristotle’s philosophy who was a contemporary as well as a student of Plato. Next, I will delve into the question of how does eudaimonia appear in the philosophy of Aristotle. Finally, I will ponder upon what elements of his philosophy regarding happiness can still be found applicable in the present-day context when happiness is regarded as an essential part of a good society.
Stylistically, Aristotle was clearer and more unambiguous to some extent than his teacher, even though his philosophy still leaves room for different interpretations.[1] Instead of prose-like dialogues, Aristotle wrote scientific treatises somewhat similar to contemporary factual texts, where one single, fixed theme is being focused on. Regarding the themes of happiness, justice, and relation between the two, Aristotle’s most central work is his principal work on ethics i.e. Nicomachean Ethics in which the first book focuses especially on addressing eudaimonia. Similar to Plato, Aristotle regarded virtues and virtuousness as the foundation of justice and ethics. Both philosophers also share the distinct idea that virtues are the most important factor in the pursuit of happiness. Yet, deviating from his teacher, Aristotle approached the topic from a normative perspective: Aristotle clearly defends the idea that the individual should continuously act virtuously as well as mature in the part of one’s life instead on settling on performing individual virtuous deeds. Like Plato, Aristotle regarded happiness as the completion (telos in Greek) of life which the individual is able to reach by striving towards virtuousness. To put it simply, the theory of virtues can be summarized into the following points: 1) virtue ethics focuses on the individual and his or her traits and not on single decisions nor principles; 2) virtues are good habits and learned through practice; 3) the appropriate virtues are discovered by witnessing and modelling certain type of behavior; 4) to become virtuous oneself, the individual must witness others practising good manners; 5) virtues should be inspected as a part of societal situation; 6) goals are key factors in virtue ethics.[2]
As was the case with Plato, in Aristotle’s philosophy it is possible to interpret eudaimonia i.e. happiness meaning life in which a person fares and lives well enough.[3] To be more precise, Aristotle defined eudaimonia as an activity of a being with a psyche that displays the being’s characteristic being virtuous.[4] According to Aristotle’s definition, non-human animals are left outside the sphere of eudaimonia since they, according to Aristotle, do not have the same cognitive and moral agency as humans. Neither is happiness for Aristotle merely one single good thing among other good things, but instead all single good things enjoyed by the individual belong to the range of happiness.[5] What then constitutes happiness in Aristotle’s thought? Aristotle addresses the question alongside with Nicomachean Ethics in Eudemian Ethics and Rhetoric[6]. Generally, the components of happiness outlined by Aristotle can be understood as things or actions that can be regarded to be goals as themselves.[7] The interpretation is understandable when the importance of teleology i.e. finality or goal-oriented thinking in Aristotle’s philosophy is taken into consideration. For example, pleasure can be considered as a goal worth pursuing in itself, intrinsic value of which makes it part of happiness. On the other hand, certain objects can have symbolic value to its owner, but this should be perceived rather as external than intrinsic value. As A. W. Price agues, Aristotle hardly thought of happiness as a concrete whole as he is presenting strong claims about its finality[8]: similar to Plato, for Aristotle happiness is worth pursuing for its own sake and not for the sake of some other thing.[9] Other things are worth pursuing solely because we pursue them because of happiness.[10] Equally, happiness is the first principle (arkhe) and cause of all good things.[11] Aristotle believed that not only was happiness the final but also the natural aim of every intentional human action. Appropriate action means the same as acting well what happiness is all about in the end.[12]
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes that “we choose honor, pleasure, intelligence and virtue in all its forms for the sake of happiness assessing that through these we become happy.”[13] Virtues should be valued for their own sake even then when they do not have any positive consequences.[14] Thus, we should act virtuously according to the given situation instead of pursuing praise and prizes for our actions. The only prize the individual should expect while acting virtuously is the intrinsic value of acting right. How then should the relation between virtuousness and concrete action be understood in Aristotle’s thinking? One interpretation suggests that when intelligence and virtue are being practised together, we appreciate them in relation to happiness that is not a direct consequence of this. Here, again we can assume Aristotle following his teacher Plato who argued that virtuousness in itself is sufficient to make a person happy. Even though virtue, intelligence, and pleasure would not be regarded as examples of acting well, they are nevertheless essential parts of it. Thus, it can be argued that we act well through them.[15]
A significant notion in Aristotle’s philosophy regarding acting virtuously is the idea of acting between two extremes: excess and insufficiency. This idea is known better as the golden mean. Virtues are situated somewhere between two extremes that themselves, in turn, are vices. If we take courage as an example, the lack of courage is cowardice, and the excess of courage is recklessness. Virtue displays the reasoning and thinking supported by Aristotle as the basis of acting right and virtuously. In a situation that demands courage, a coward might easily think too much of all the possible dangers and threats which prevents him or her from acting. Similarly, a foolhardy person has thought too little of the danger posed by the situation and thus acts thoughtlessly. A courageous person, in turn, recognizes the threats of a dangerous situation but in the end makes the conscious decision to act to the best of one’s ability.
In Plato’s Republic, the ideal society is formed as such that it provides favorable external circumstances for the virtuousness of the citizens. To the same degree, Aristotle states in Nicomachean Ethics that happiness is possible only in a society and thus, virtuous people do not pursue good things solely for themselves but for others as well.[16] Like Plato, Aristotle believed that upbringing and education play an important role in adopting virtues: it is not enough that an individual only acts virtuously, but he must also know that he or she is acting virtuously and act purposefully and with certainty in the light of this knowledge.[17] As mentioned earlier, an individual learns virtuousness by witnessing the virtuousness of others and modelling this behavior. In the case of eudaimonia, Aristotle was even stricter in his view: according to him eudaimonia is the realization and perfect use of virtue – not conditionally but absolutely.[18] At the same time, Aristotle nevertheless accepted the idea that external goods function as prerequisites for acting well as its resources and instruments.[19] Among these Aristotle included, among other things, friends, wealth, and power. He thought that a person without friends, power, strength, or good looks, for instance, does not have so many possibilities for long-term virtuous activity. In other words, virtuousness and happiness require good fortune as well. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not claim that a person should not strive towards virtuousness in poor conditions as well since virtuous action in itself is not dependent on chance.[20]
Aristotle rejected pleasure and wealth as the final forms of happiness[21] and instead preferred intellectual contemplation.[22] In Aristotle’s teleological thinking everything and being has a function that it performs with certain ability or abilities. In case of humans, that characteristic and natural function is the ability to both rational and moral activity. During the time of Aristotle, these abilities belonged to the gods as well. Thus, a person is at his or her best when he or she pursues the highest possible reasoning which, in case of Aristotle, was theoria i.e. intellectual contemplation.[23] On the other hand, in the case of both Plato and Aristotle it would be too simplifying to speak only of moral virtues that can be characterized as the virtues of character as well. Instead, both viewed that there are also intellectual virtues i.e. virtues of reason. Among these virtues Aristotle counted wisdom, technical knowledge, and intuitive reason. Moral virtues, on the other hand, refer to character traits that enable one to become a good person and these include courage, temperance, modesty, humility, generosity, benevolence, veraciousness, honesty, and justice.[24] Plato viewed wisdom as one of the cardinal virtues that were the same in case of Aristotle, but Aristotle divided wisdom into two separate virtues: theoretical (sofia or episteme) and practical (phronesis) wisdom. Practical wisdom is directly connected with action (praksis) whereas theoretical wisdom can be interpreted as intellectual contemplation that does not have one clear aim. The latter can be understood as intellectual exercise, philosophy, that is intrinsically a virtue and advances happiness.[25] Nevertheless, it can be argued that in Aristotle’s philosophy both “right” desire (i.e. positive feelings towards right action) and “right” reason are together the basic prerequisites for making good ethical decisions.[26] Contemplation in Aristotle’s thought is connected to other components constituting eudaimonia which are pursued for the sake of happiness. Theoretical wisdom, however, is more related to happiness since it is not pursued for the sake of some other goal. Thus, contemplation should be perceived as a goal in itself more than other components of happiness and thus it has a closer kinship with eudaimonia.[27]
Conclusion
Aristotle’s influence on European thought is arguably more consistent than that of Plato’s. Thus, while considering the applicability of Aristotle’s philosophy from the perspective of present-day there is no need to use as much creative thinking as with Plato, and rather we can clearly outline the historical influence that Aristotle has had down to this day. Going through these, however, would be beyond the scope of this text, and it will suffice to mention that Aristotelian ethics has influenced, among others, the thought of Karl Marx[28], the development of the theory of justice by Martha Nussbaum[29] as well as modern virtue ethics.[30] Yet, Aristotelian ethics should not be approached without criticism, but as was the case with Plato in the previous blog post, I want to focus here on constructive and practicable aspects of these ancient thinkers. Again, the ideas of Aristotle required certain re-interpretation and application in the contemporary context. To this project I will now focus on briefly.
Aristotle believed that a person should act virtuously because of its intrinsic value and not in the hopes of some kind of reward. Nowadays this idea can be further developed in such a direction that the moral uncompromisingness of an individual can be viewed as rewarding if it acts as a positive model and example in a society. If one’s actions inspire others to act right, this can be considered a sufficient “reward”. Following Aristotle’s thought, we should act as good role models to our close relatives and other members of our society. Acting right, and most of all, just should not, however, be tied primarily to the profit motive. Instead, we should act virtuously because of its intrinsic value but also because we want to live in a better and more just world. Currently, phenomena such as social media and populism throw a shadow over virtuous activity in the form of virtual signaling. This means activity when an agent expresses societal or political opinions in the hopes of appearing as a good person in the eyes of the receivers.[31] It should be self-evident that such activity would not have any place in Aristotle’s ethics. We should demand that especially public figures act truly virtuously instead of signaling and show good example to others.
The golden mean can still be regarded as some sort of timeless ideal and guiding principle. At the same time, in a world that is constantly becoming more complex it is justifiable to ask what actual possibilities an individual has to weigh the various sides of things from the perspective of ethical decision-making in a given situation.[32] The golden mean as presented by Aristotle should not be regarded as a practical manual but rather a virtuous ideal manner to think critically about real-life situations.[33] Yet, the golden mean still holds relevance in the time of extremes and excess. Especially when the current ecological crises are considered from the perspectives of deep ecology and strong sustainability, it is evident that the total consumption of the wealthiest countries should be reduced while the living standards of the least well-off countries are improved. One means of accomplishing this according to the golden mean would be, among other things, the redistribution of current wealth. These are some themes that I have already covered in this blog while writing about the ecological approach to climate change.[34]
Both Plato and Aristotle seemed to share the view that eudaimonia or happiness is the ultimate goal of human activity.[35] It is not practical to focus here on what happiness concretely meant to these ancient thinkers. Furthermore, it is legitimate to question whether the term ‘happiness’ is the best possible translation for the concept of eudaimonia.[36] Alongside of the previously mentioned ‘faring well’ and ‘living well’ one alternative presented is ‘the best possible life’.[37] Instead of translation problems it is more fruitful here to ponder upon what happiness means to us moderns and whether is a goal worth pursuing in a societal sense.
When taking a cue from Aristotle, as was the case with Plato, it is justifiable to demand that our societies provide the best available circumstances where an individual can pursue real and long-lasting happiness – especially when this is understood as more comprehensively as best possible life. This does not mean the fleeting satisfaction of pleasures and desires which can temporarily improve one’s life but are not, nevertheless, sufficient for happiness. As Aristotle himself says “one swallow does not make a summer nor does one fine day. Similarly, one day or moment of happiness does not make a man extremely blessed or happy.”[38] Contrary to Plato, who believed happiness to be a life-long goal and accomplishment, Aristotle deviates here slightly from his teacher’s view: eudaimonia for him is not the outcome of life-long pursuit, not something that should be expected as satisfying life. Instead, it can be life itself: thoroughly pleasant and worthwhile.[39] Similarly, politicians and policy-makers should not hand out empty promises that the position of underprivileged, for instance, will be improved sometime in the future; societies should take care of the people so that their lives would be as pleasant as possible and above all worth living for right now. As was the case already with Plato, we can state that in practice this would mean, for example, the satisfaction of basic needs or securing capabilities that are the prerequisites for dignified human life.
Even though happiness can still and justifiably be considered as a measure of good life in the same way as a society providing the external circumstances for this can be regarded as a good society, there are reason to be critical as well; is eudaimonia the most usable idea from Plato and Aristotle as we are pursuing a better world and more just societies? Here it is easy to give an affirmative answer, if we are to understand eudaimonia, especially in the case of Aristotle, as the best possible life. Yet, in the philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle there rises another concept that might be even more important in the pursuit of justice; in these two texts, I have frequently touched on virtues, virtuousness, and virtue ethics. The latter of these is one of the oldest ethical theories both in the Western and non-Western traditions from which especially Chinese philosophy and Confucius can be highlighted.[40] Equally, virtue ethics was a central concept in Christian moral theology and Jewish philosophy during the Middle Ages.[41] Virtue ethics seems to be a concept that is more inclusive in the history of the theories of justice as it also encompasses philosophical movements outside the Eurocentric mainstream culture. When exploring the history of justice, it should be weighed whether virtue ethics is something universal and timeless. If the answer is affirmative, we should recognize its potential as we pursue a world that is globally just.
SOURCES:
Ackrill, J.: Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Essays on Plato and Aristotle. Edited by Ackrill, J. 1974.
Aristotle:
- Eudemian Ethics. Teoksessa Aristotle’s Works. Volume XX. Athenian Constitution. Eudemian Ethics. Virtues and Vices. Loeb Classical Library 285. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926.
- Politics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932.
- The “Art” of Rhetoric. Translated by J. H. Freese Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926.
- Retoriikka. Runousoppi. (Rhetorica. Poetica.) Suomentaneet Paavo Hohti, Päivi Myllykoski (Retoriikka) ja Paavo Hohti (Runousoppi). Selitykset laatinut Juha Sihvola. Teokset 9. Classica-sarja. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 1997.
Kraut, R.: Aristotle’s ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Aristotle-ethics
McCarthy, G. E.: Marx and the Ancients. Classical Ethics, Social Justice, and Nineteenth-Century Political Economy. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990.
Moran, J.: Aristotle on ’eudaimonia’ (happiness). Think Spring 2018.
Murphy, P. E.: Character and virtue ethics in international marketing: An agenda for managers, researchers and educators. Journal of Business Ethics, 18(1), 107–124, 1999.
Nussbaum, M. C.: Virtue ethics: A misleading category? The Journal of Ethics, 3, 163–201, 1999.
Papouli, E.: Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a conceptual framework for the study and practice of social work in modern times. European Journal of Social Work
2019, VOL. 22, NO. 6, 921–934.
Price, A.W. Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Russell, D. C.: Introduction: Virtue ethics to modern moral philosophy. In D. C. Russell (Ed.), The cambridge companion to virtue ethics (pp. 1–6). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Virtue signalling. Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. Oxford University Press.
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/virtue-signalling?q=virtue+signaling
[1] Ackrill 1974, 179
[2] Murphy 1999, 109
[3] Arist.Eth.Nic. I.4 1095a18–20
[4] Moran 2018
[5] Price 2011, 34
[6] Arist.Rh.I.5 1360b6–7
[7] Ackrill 1980, 19
[8] Price 2011, 36-7
[9] Arist.Eth.Nic. I.7 1097a33
[10] Ackrill 1974, 187
[11] Arist.Eth.Eud. I.12 1102a3–4
[12] Price 2011, 41
[13] Arist.Eth.Nic. I7 1097b2-5
[14] Price 2011, 44
[15] Price 2011, 45
[16] Papouli 2009
[17] Arist.Eth.Nic. 1105b
[18] Arist.Pol. 1332a7–10
[19] Price 2011, 60
[20] Kraut 2022
[21] McCarthy 1990, 60
[22] Price 2011, 47
[23] Moran 2018
[24] Papouli 2009
[25] Price 2011, 71
[26] Papouli 2009
[27] Price 2011, 76
[28] McCarthy 1990
[29] Nussbaum 1999
[30] Papouli 2009
[31] virtue signaling, Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
[32] Papouli 2009
[33] Kraut 2022
[34] Lahtinen 2023
[35] Price 2011, 80
[36] Moran 2018
[37] Ackrill 1974, 189
[38] Arist.Eth.Nic. I.7 1098a18–20
[39] Ackrill 1974, 184
[40] Russell 2013
[41] Papouli 2009
