Utilitarianism

Petri Lahtinen

Classical utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is usually regarded as a general moral theory, but it has also been applied to theories of justice and its issues. The central concept of utilitarianism is utility which gives its name to the whole school of thought. The roots of classical utilitarianism are usually traced back to England at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, and the English Enlightenment philosopher Jeremy Bentham is often cited as its first major exponent: inspired by the French Revolution and its principles, Bentham began to advocate the protection of certain fundamental rights for all, regardless of class, wealth or gender. Bentham was influenced in particular by the French thinkers Claude Adrien Helvétius and Cesare Beccaria, whose writings concerned issues of education and law. The fundamental premise of Bentham’s utilitarianism was the primary right to avoid suffering and to receive pleasure. He considered human nature to be based on the assumption that one always acts to maximise one’s pleasure and minimise one’s suffering. However, Bentham’s concept of pleasure should not be interpreted solely as sensual hedonism, but it can be understood more broadly as happiness. At this point, the historical continuity of Western theories of justice can be observed in the light of Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on eudaimonia as the basis of the good life. As we have noted in previous texts, although eudaimonia is commonly translated as ‘happiness’, it is more apt to understand it as ‘doing well’. Similarly, in classical utilitarianism, happiness is usually understood as well-being: the well-being of the community as a whole is taken to be the sum of the well-being of all the individuals within it. In accordance with the general principles of utilitarianism, Bentham’s moral theory advocated conditions that would guarantee the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number.

            The initial influences of Bentham’s theory were found not only from the ideals of the French Revolution, but also from the scientific need to develop moral thinking into a calculative direction: Bentham imagined that pleasure or well-being could be measured and calculated, on the basis of which morality could be built. The calculative approach developed by Bentham was based on the assumption that all pleasures and sufferings are qualitatively the same, while their quantitative characteristics vary. However, Bentham did not go so far in his theory as to outline a precise and exact mathematical calculus of pleasures and sufferings. Rather, Bentham’s calculus should be understood above all as a some sort of ideal. Bentham viewed human psychology as something inherently concerned with the egoistic pursuit of self-interest as a maximization of one’s own pleasure. To realize the utilitarian project of maximizing pleasure for all and minimizing suffering, Bentham proposed means of enlightenment, education, legislation and social policy.

In 1861, the English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill published his work Utilitarianism, which was meant as a commentary of Bentham’s philosophy. Mill followed Bentham in the basic assumption that happiness or well-being is intrinsically connected with morality. Mill himself defined utility as pleasure combined with the absence of pain. Moreover, regarding pleasure itself Mill asserted that certain types of pleasure are more valuable than others, and thus people should concentrate on pursuit of these. Mill, in particular, viewed pleasures of this kind to those related to the intellect, emotions, imagination and moral feelings. According to the psychology of Mill, a conscious and rational person chooses intellectual pleasure over sensual pleasure. It is a weakness of character if a person is inclined to gravitate towards lower pleasures. At the same time, however, Mill also recognised that the availability of pleasures also influences people’s choices. In contrast to Bentham, Mill’s emphasis on intellectual pleasures highlighted above all the inner life of human beings. Nevertheless, community also played an essential part in the utilitarianism Mill outlined. In emphasising the inner life of humans, Mill followed Aristotle in arguing that there is a certain human nature: this innate and inherent psychological nature of human dictates certain objective conditions for human happiness. Mill himself relied on associative psychology: he believed that people learn to regard something as a means to happiness, and thus a bond is created between the end and the means. The psychology of both Bentham and Mill can be described as hedonistic psychology, which assumes that people seek pleasure in all their activities.

In the context of justice, Mill’s principle of happiness should be seen as a theoretical tool for identifying moral duties. Utilitarianism exhibits an altruistic capacity to sacrifice one’s greatest good for the good of others. Mill therefore considered that happiness, as a measure of right action, is the happiness of all those who are somehow affected by that particular action. Two requirements follow from this assumption: first, a certain social arrangement must be adapted to balance between the interests of the individual and those of the whole. Secondly, Mill, again following Bentham, suggested that education and influencing opinions should be used to create a lasting link between personal happiness and the good of others. Mill opposed the categorical imperative proposed by Kant, because Mill believed that, given the diversity of human life, it was not possible to draw up rules of behaviour that were without exception in relation to morality. Mill’s own utilitarian morality represented what he called consequentialism, in which the moral value of an action is determined by the effects of the action on happiness. The motives of the act, on the other hand, had nothing to do with the moral value of the act. Moreover, Mill believed that moral emotions are learned and assimilated from the environment.

Virtue ethics of antiquity was also present in Mill’s utilitarianism. Virtue was also seen as an end in itself, to be pursued for its own sake, as the main contributor to general happiness. Here, the philosophy of Mill is in line with Aristotle and Plato. On the basis of virtue ethics and utilitarian morality, Mill created the concept of utilitarian justice, which was based on five principles: legal rights, moral rights, each according to one’s merit, the infallibility of trust and impartiality i.e. equality. Of these, Mill considered impartiality in particular to be an essential factor in moral evaluation: like the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith, Mill considered impartiality to require external evaluation. Similarly, Mill viewed impartiality as corresponding to the notion of justice in our everyday thinking.

During its own time, classical utilitarianism represented a very radical way of thinking. It emphasised the well-being of all people at a time when true prosperity was largely the privilege of a small minority, while the majority of the people lived in some degree of deprivation or even misery. The main opponent of classical utilitarianism in its day was intuitionism, which held that morality was based on a set of first moral truths whose validity was identified by intuition. What is revolutionary about Bentham’s thinking is that it also guaranteed certain fundamental rights to animals.

The central ideas and problems of utilitarianism

Historically, utilitarianism has been an exceptional theory of morality and justice because it is based, above all, on a concept such as welfare, which is understood as a phenomenon based on the subjective experience of the individual. Although utilitarianism cannot be spoken of as a single theory, most theories are united by their reliance on consequentialism: the moral value of an act is always considered in terms of the consequences of the act in question, rather than the act itself. For example, lying may be morally acceptable if it results in a greater increase in well-being relative to the suffering it causes. Historically, consequentialism was a significant departure from, for example, the categorical imperative proposed by Immanuel Kant, which represented a moral norm independent of circumstances.

Two general arguments have often been put forward for utilitarianism: first, utilitarianism considers well-being to be intrinsically important and good in itself, while misery, pain and suffering are intrinsically bad and undesirable. Therefore, well-being should be pursued and misery avoided. Second, utilitarianism relies on the equality of individuals. On the other hand, the realisation of equality often conflicts with utilitarian calculations of well-being. Many utilitarian theories are based, at least in theory, on the assumption that welfare is measurable and calculable. Thus, according to utilitarian morality and justice, action should be based on principles that maximise combined utility or welfare. Presented in this way, the problem with utilitarianism becomes one of indifference to the distribution of benefits or welfare: for the utilitarian, for example, an increase in the benefits of one hundred well-off people is preferable to an increase in the benefits of fifty underprivileged people. The problem with utilitarian calculus is that it fails to take full account of the diversity of living reality. In the example mentioned above, the proportionality of the added benefit should also be taken into account in the name of justice and equality; if the benefit is understood as, for instance, an easily calculable amount of money, it can be argued that, for example, an increase of €100 in the income of the less well-off has a significantly greater welfare-enhancing effect than giving the same amount to those already well-off.

There is another important problem with utilitarian calculus: if the calculation of utility or welfare is based on the sum of the combined benefits of the members of society, from a purely mathematical calculus point of view, the total benefit can be increased by increasing the number of individuals. For example, from a utilitarian perspective, a state that takes in refugees from a country in a military conflict increases its own total utility. In such an example, the problem of defining utilitarian calculus is again encountered: it can be argued that the welfare of refugees in the host country increases if they are no longer under imminent threat of violence. On the other hand, if these refugees are forced to live in refugee camps that are questionable from a humanitarian perspective and under conditions that would be unacceptable to the country’s own citizens, one can justifiably question the increase in calculatory welfare. Such an example again demonstrates the problematic nature of pure computationality in the choice of its criteria and indicators in a world of diversity. In the light of these problems, some utilitarian theorists have suggested an alternative of focusing on average utility rather than total utility. Average utility is defined as the sum of the utilities of all individuals under consideration divided by the total number of people. Even this kind of calculation is not without its problems: calculating average benefits proves difficult, for example in countries with high income inequalities.

In addition to the calculation of total utility and average utility, utilitarian theorists generally differ in their understanding of utility itself. As noted earlier, classical utilitarianism represents a hedonistic theory of utility, in which utility is identified with happiness. Utility is thus understood as a subjective experience of happiness or pleasure. In terms of the utilitarian calculus, the happiness of each individual plays an equal role in the calculation and maximisation of happiness. On the other hand, like computationality, hedonistic utilitarianism has also been criticised. Human beings are psychologically complex beings and agents; therefore, human happiness cannot be reduced to the mere receipt of experiences of pleasure and enjoyment. Instead, people want to be active agents: they want to do things themselves and act with a sense of purpose. Thus, from a social point of view, when designing functional societies, it is not enough to try to ‘feed’ people with experiences of happiness, pleasure and enjoyment. Society should provide a wide range of opportunities and conditions for people to pursue happiness in their own way. When examining human psychology, it must be also taken into account that people often pursue a wide range of goals beyond hedonistic pleasure and enjoyment.

Because of the criticism of hedonistic utility theory, several utilitarian theorists have sought to replace the definition of hedonistic utility with the concept of preference. Preference refers to the personal tastes of individuals, the realisation and satisfaction of which can be seen as contributing to human satisfaction and happiness. Preference theory rejects the erroneous assumption of hedonic utility theory about the commensurability of the components of human happiness and recognises that human happiness consists of many different things. One person may perceive happiness to be financial wealth, while another person may perceive happiness as being free, even if less financially wealthy. However, preferences are not without their problems, as they may be based on incorrect information or be ill-considered. In the previous example, it can be thought that the notion of financial wealth making one happy is based on erroneous external impressions and assumptions. Utilitarian theoreticians have responded to this criticism by arguing that preferences should be determined on the basis of rational, reasoned and informed judgements. Such thinking can be traced back to the ideals of Enlightenment behind classical utilitarianism: people should be guided in the right direction, so to speak, by education, training and enlightenment.

As noted earlier, classical utilitarianism tends to emphasise the consequences, and especially the benefits, of individual actions. A moral theory based on the consequences of actions was called consequentialism. If the above theory of preferences as rationally reasoned inferences is accepted, the morality of an act is determined, from a utilitarian perspective, by the number of preferences it satisfies. This is another key point of contention among utilitarian theoreticians: whether, from a moral point of view, the maximisation of utility or preferences should be linked to individual acts and their consequences or to some set of more general rules. Consequentialism has been criticised for failing to recognise the qualitative difference between different preferences and, in its simplest form, for failing to exclude any preferences from its calculations. For example, it seems intuitively wrong to equate the preferences of two people from a moral point of view in a situation where one experiences pleasure in caring for others, while the other gains pleasure from torturing others. The personal preferences or experiences of subjective well-being of individuals are far from being always necessarily moral in any way. Instead of evaluating individual actions, some utilitarian theorists want to restore the utilitarian calculations to the rules and norms that govern human actions and behaviour. This kind of thinking is called normative utilitarianism, and it considers it morally right to follow rules that maximise the total benefit for as many people as possible. However, critics of utilitarianism do not believe that normative utilitarianism adequately addresses some of the shortcomings of artificial consequentialism either. The key issue is to find a coherent principle between utility calculations and moral rules.

Alternatives to utilitarianism

To summarise in short, utilitarianism has been criticised on three grounds. First, utilitarianism does not traditionally seem to exclude preferences of any kind from its own utilitarian calculations, even if they might cause malaise or even suffering to other living beings. Second, utilitarianism does not guarantee individuals traditional rights of freedom, and may even favour the violation of these rights. An example of this is the use of slave labour to maximise the benefits of the privileged groups. From a utilitarian point of view, oppressing different minorities or violating their rights may be desirable if the suffering of this minority does not affect the overall benefit as much as the welfare of the majority. Indeed, one of the critical shortcomings of utilitarianism is that it does not see fundamental rights as intrinsically valuable. Thirdly, utilitarianism, in its mathematical computationality, is primarily concerned with total utility, while the fair and equitable distribution of utility remains a secondary matter. In the utilitarian worldview, people are seen primarily as units that receive and retain utility; the quantity of utility takes precedence over everything else. When considering the unequal distribution of wealth and other resources in the modern age, utilitarianism appears to be an extremely problematic theory of justice as its focus on the total amount of utility can justify unequal distribution. Moreover, utilitarian morality no longer corresponds to our everyday and intuitive conception of morality, since utilitarianism does not seem to recognise or value the separateness and difference of individuals.

This critique has led to the development of other theories of justice that are based on both the subjective experience and on utilitarianism. Welfare egalitarianism conceives of utilitarian utility as the well-being of individuals, which simultaneously serves as a measure of justice in society. At the same time, egalitarianism tackles another problem of classical utilitarianism by emphasising the even and equal distribution of welfare rather than its maximisation. Welfare egalitarianism considers the best outcome to be one in which inequality is minimised. However, the theory has been seen as having problems with so-called downward equalisation and upward lifting. In other words, in the pursuit of equality in the current situation of existing and inherited inequalities, it is problematic to determine how much the situation of the better off should be weakened and how much the situation of the worse off should be made better. Egalitarianism has often been criticised precisely because it seeks equality by levelling down so that only the situation of the better off is made worse. While it is easy to argue that the standard of living of the world’s wealthiest people should be lowered, both from the point of view of equality and sustainability, it is morally questionable not to call for a rise in the standard of living of groups of people whose basic rights and needs are not currently being met.

The second alternative is a theory called prioritarianism, which is a kind of hybrid between utilitarianism and egalitarianism. The name comes from the term priority, and the theory considers the welfare of the most disadvantaged to be a priority in fair and moral action. Prioritarianism takes into account both the low level of well-being of the poor, the number of poor people and the ways in which their well-being can be increased most. Prioritarianism can be criticised from two angles. Firstly, it can be questioned whether it wants to completely ignore the maintenance of the well-being of the better off and focus solely on the well-being of the less well off. Secondly, prioritarianism should problematise how high the welfare of the disadvantaged should be raised, and what is an adequate level of human welfare. From an environmental and sustainability perspective, it is worth pointing out that it is precisely the living standards and consumption levels of the well-off that have contributed significantly to the current ecological crises. It is therefore worth problematizing how close the welfare of the less well off an be brought to that of the better, while still respecting planetary limits. It seems clear that the satisfaction of basic human needs should be guaranteed to ensure well-being. At the same time, the components of well-being for the better off should be critically reassessed.

In response to the criticisms of prioritarianism, some utilitarian theorists have developed an approach known as sufficientarianism. As with prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, in its English name, expresses its central thesis: in the case of sufficientarianism, this is sufficiency. The approach does not view the self-interested improvement of the position of disadvantaged people as a viable solution, regardless of how poor or weak their physical and mental resources, conditions and circumstances are in absolute terms. Instead, sufficientarianism emphasises that it is moral and just to demand that the adequate well-being of all people is secured. But here too there are two obvious problems. First, there is the problem of trying to define an unambiguous, common, and universal level of ‘adequate’ well-being. Second, sufficientarianism also does not provide a satisfactory solution to the current unequal distribution of wealth. Even if it were possible to secure adequate welfare for the currently disadvantaged – whatever that means – one can still legitimately ask whether it is fair or equal to have radical differences in the distribution of wealth.

Conclusion

In this text, I have examined utilitarianism as part of the history of Western theories regarding justice. Although utilitarian theories have been subject to significant and justified criticism, the historical importance of utilitarianism cannot be denied. It is an important part of the European cultural heritage which, inspired by the French Revolution, sought to elevate Enlightenment values and subjective experience as principles of morality and justice. Later theories of justice and morality based on subjective experience have been criticised in particular for failing to take into account the different ways in which different individuals transform their diverse physical and mental resources into different kinds of well-being. In other words, in its pure mathematical computationality, utilitarianism often ignores the incoherent, diverse and contradictory living reality. However, in its own time, utilitarianism, for all its radicalism, was a very popular school of thought: it dominated the debate on issues and problems of justice well into the 20th century, particularly in Anglo-American thought. It was only in the 1970s that the theory of justice put forward by the American philosopher John Rawls, which Rawls offered in particular as an alternative to utilitarianism, significantly changed the direction of theories of justice. This change marked a shift from a subjective conception of justice towards an objective conception of justice.

It should be noted, however, that utilitarianism and its variants have noble and good goals in themselves. However, utilitarianism fails to provide credible practical solutions and approaches to its principles. One of the central innovations of utilitarianism that remains useful is the consideration of the well-being and suffering of all living and sentient beings. Thus, utilitarianism can be seen as having had a significant influence on, for example, ideas on animal rights in the 20th century. For example, the book Animal Liberation by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer, who represents the ethical perspective of preference utilitarianism, has functioned as an ethical justification for many vegetarians and vegans. The book has also had a significant impact on the animal rights movement. In the light of the pressing present-day ecological crises, it is therefore appropriate to ask whether utilitarian theories still have any use in extending our own imagination and worldview of welfare to non-human animals and other living beings that have agency.

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